Status: working proposal. Simulation figures are first-pass estimates from seeded runs (the simulation script accompanies this proposal)
This proposal replaces the accredited-committee sequencing of Bedrock channels with a permissionless design built from two components:
Three exit-mechanism families were compared for the withdrawal problem:
| Family | L1 requirement | Off-chain requirement | Withdrawal latency |
|---|---|---|---|
| Challenge windows (optimistic-rollup style) | dispute verification on the hot path (fraud proof or dispute circuit) | funded watchers paid from an offender-side bond; challenger-side proving on dispute | days (window) |
| Proof-carrying withdrawals | proof verification per exit (~ZkSig gas class) | standing prover infrastructure (first-pass estimate: one 32-core machine per ~16 sustained zone TPS, or ~8.5 min proving per 10,000-inscription replay without checkpoints) | proving time + inclusion |
| Aged withdrawals with in-window reversal | one age check, reusing the ledger’s existing aging machinery | none on the safety path; an incentive design for reversals | epoch class (aging window) |
The comparison supports that direction for this platform. Estimated L1 validation cost, from the specs’ gas anchors, does not discriminate between the families (the withdrawal operation’s signature verification dominates in all of them, within ~3% at realistic dispute rates), so the real discriminators are L1 complexity, standing infrastructure, and watcher dependence, and the aged-withdrawal design is the only one that adds no new machinery to the base layer. Its two open costs are withdrawal latency in the epoch class and the reversal-incentive problem: making sure an honest sequencer is incentivized, or at least not disincentivized, to post the reversing transfer rather than leave it to the next sequencer. That incentive design is the primary next work item (section 7).
Channels are ordered inscription logs on the Bedrock L1: zones derive their state by replaying a channel’s messages, and the L1 stores and orders inscriptions without ever interpreting their content (followers validate every inscription and skip invalid ones). The current Mantle specification sequences each channel by a committee of accredited keys in round-robin, with threshold signatures for configuration and fund movement.
The permissionless design targets the writer role as liveness and censorship resistance only: the L1 already provides data availability, ordering, and replayability, so writers secure no funds and enforce no execution. Standing constraints:
The recently merged Channel Participation in PoS update (Mantle v1.8.0) provides the value model this proposal builds on:
NoteId, value, and ZkPublicKey intact, and remain eligible for L1 proof-of-leadership once aged.CHANNEL_TRANSFER consumes channel notes and creates new ones (resetting their age); CHANNEL_WITHDRAW releases notes to whoever holds their ZkPublicKey, preserving age.