The Cross-Zone Atomic Coordination Protocol (CACP) currently allows either sequencer to abort the protocol at any phase prior to Phase 3 completing, at no cost. This asymmetry enables the aborting party to avoid bearing any penalties, while the counterparty has already consumed resources for validation, signing, and state management.
This document explores mechanisms to make protocol abort costly for the aborting party. Three directions are examined in order of increasing complexity:
The on-chain approach is examined first as it is easier to reason about. The off-chain approach is derived from the same incentive structure but avoids L1 spam and third-party coordination.
In the current CACP design, a sequencer that sends PROPOSE or ACCEPT and subsequently aborts incurs no direct cost. The counterparty, however, has already performed:
MantleTx constructionThis cost asymmetry enables two classes of attack described in the CACP Security Analysis: resource exhaustion via repeated spurious proposals, and packing-rights manipulation via deliberate abort to stall a counterpart sequencer.
Before addressing the constraint that Logos L1 has no smart contract support, we first design an idealised version of the mechanism that assumes L1 can lock funds and enforce conditional transfers. This gives a clean, complete specification of what the mechanism must do. In Direction 3, we then examine how much of this logic can be moved off-chain, replacing L1 dependencies with cryptographic primitives.
This section instantiates the running example of the Overview with concrete values. We assume for this section that the Logos L1 supports a primitive vault operation: a sequencer can lock a specified amount of tokens against a proposal identifier, with conditional release rules. No general-purpose smart contract is required — only the following operations:
Throughout this document, a proposal is identified by proposal_id = H(intent), binding all vault state to the specific cross-zone operation being coordinated.