Parameters:

• $k$: number of blocks to wait for finality
• $\epsilon$, $\sigma$: adversarial stake paramenters:
  • $1/2-\epsilon$ initial adversarial stake allocation
  • $\sigma$ allowed adversarial stake shift during execution (over short enough time periods)
• $D$: corruption delay, honest party will be corrupted after $D$ slots from when it initially receives the corrupt messsage.
• $L$: lifetime of system (in slots)
• $R$: length of epoch (in slots)

Slot Leader Selection

• exactly 1 leader is selected for each slot.
• within an epoch, leaders know ahead of time which slot they have won

The Leader Selection Process is defined below:

Fork Choice

Given current chains, the longest chain is selected, ties are broken arbitrarily.

Security

If two honest clients go offline on slot $sl_1$ and come back on line at $sl_2 = sl_1 + n$, then, the density of forking chains is $e^{-\Omega(\sqrt{n})}$. This is the case because adversaries would need to control all $n$ slots to give the offline clients different views.