Owner: @Alexander Mozeika
Reviewers: 🟢@Marcin Pawlowski 🟢@Marvin Jones ****🟢@Mehmet 🟢@Álvaro Castro-Castilla
This document examines the conditions required for fair and reliable distribution of rewards in a decentralised data availability (DA) network, where $N$ nodes independently sample peers to judge their performance. Our focus is on three core properties:
Throughout, we support our theoretical claims with simulations and numerical experiments, showing that the proposed sampling rates, observation windows, and voting thresholds create an efficient, scalable reward system that is both reliable and resilient against failures or adversarial behaviour.
The probability to achieve full coverage plotted as function of the number of blocks $T$ for the network size $N\in\{10^2,10^3,10^4\}$. Here it assumed that a node samples $K=20$ nodes per block.
The number of blocks $T$, which is needed to achieve full coverage (with prob. $0.99$ and $0.999$), is plotted as function of the network size $N$. Here it assumed that a node samples $K=20$ nodes per block.
This analysis provides theoretical foundations for a robust decentralised reward system resistant to failures and adversarial behaviour.
This document examines conditions for fair and reliable reward distribution in a decentralized data availability network with independent peer sampling.
We present a comprehensive mathematical model and theoretical framework supporting the reward distribution system. The framework consists of: