A non-interactive, extractable polynomial commitment with poly-logarithmic proof size and verifier time under Module-SIS assumptions, built via a Merkle-ized PRISIS commitment and an FRI-style split-and-fold evaluation protocol with negligible knowledge soundness (via batching).
They report indicative proof sizes (not runtime timings):
$d = 2^{20}, k=1, \ell=1$ (no batching across many claims): |$\pi$| ≈ 36.5 MB.
$d = 2^{30}, k=1, \ell=8:$ |$\pi$| ≈ 767 MB.
(Here, $\ell$ is the number of recursive rounds shown and they discuss security targeting)
Note: These are proof sizes only; the paper does not provide concrete wall-clock proof generation or verification times.
A lattice-based polynomial commitment with transparent setup (CRS is just public randomness), post-quantum security, and a Fiat–Shamir (FS) transform to the non-interactive setting; they also prove knowledge soundness against quantum adversaries using LMS22/BBK22-style techniques. It needs no pre-processing yet still attains sublinear (polylog) verification, and it naturally supports multilinear polynomials.
They give an optimized instantiation (using LNS21/LNP22-style tweaks) with $O(\sqrt[3]{L})$ proof size and verifier complexity, and show concrete sizes that beat prior work at practical degrees: for $L\!=\!2^{20}$ the proof is ~501 KB, which is 2× smaller than hash-based FRI, 6×smaller than FMN’23, and 70× smaller than SLAP; the reported sizes are 120 KB (2¹⁵), 501 KB (2²⁰), 1.51 MB (2²⁵), 5.17 MB (2³⁰).
A lattice-based polynomial commitment with transparent setup and public verification, targeting concrete efficiency (not just asymptotic). It’s built on a modified Ajtai commitment and introduces two key techniques: